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v. 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court 
to hear this appeal by Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2-
2(3) (j), 1953 as amended. This statute sets forth the Utah 
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over "orders, 
judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate 
jurisdiction." The nature of this proceeding is an appeal 
from a final order of Second District Court, the Honorable 
Rodney S. Page, in and for Davis County, State of Utah. The 
order of that Court found North Salt Lake City's breed 
specific vicious dog law to be constitutionally valid. There 
is no grant of original appellate jurisdiction to the Court 
of Appeals as would be applicable to this case. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that North 
Salt Lake City Ordinance 13-20-16E was not vague and 
violative of substantive due process, as measured by 
constitutional standards? 
II. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that 
the North Salt Lake Ordinance does not violate constitutional 
standards of equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and violate Article I, 
Section 24 of the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
III. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that 
the evidence established that predominant physical 
1 
characteristics are determinative of breed differentiation in 
the species of dogs? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AMENDMENT XIV, 
Section 1, [Citizenship - Due process of law-
Equal protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens 
of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, ARTICLE I, SECTION 24: 
[Uniform operation of law.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation. 
RULE 52(a) UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
. • . . Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity 
of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. In January 1987, the City Council of North 
Salt Lake unanimously passed and adopted the North Salt Lake 
Animal Control Ordinance, Chapter 13-20-1 et seq. The 
ordinance was thereafter amended on August 4, 1987, to 
primarily provide an administrative remedy for any person or 
entity challenging enforcement of the ordinance. 
2. On or about February 3, 1987, Kate Greenwood, 
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Andrew Greenwood, Ralph Greenwood, and the American Dog 
Breeders Association (hereinafter referred to collectively as 
"Greenwoods") filed suit against the City claiming (a) that 
the provisions of the ordinance constituted a "taking of 
property" without due process in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, (b) that the ordinance 
violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights of "equal 
protection" because the language was too vague and ambiguous 
to be enforceable, and (c) that the ordinance was both 
overinclusive and underinclusive and bore no rational 
relationship to its objective, making its enforcement an 
"unconstitutional exercise of police power" under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
3. The North Salt Lake Animal Control ordinance 
is some twenty-two (22) typewritten pages long. The 
particular language which is the subject of this lawsuit, 
however, is as follows: 
Section 13-20-01: 
"22. VICIOUS ANIMAL: Any animal which is 
dangerously aggressive or uncontrollable, including 
but not limited to, any animal which has bitten or 
in any manner attacked any person or animal. Any 
animal by its unique nature or breeding which has 
known propensities to be aggressive towards any 
person or animal." 
Section 13-20-16: 
"A. PREMISES, MUZZLE: It shall be unlawful for 
the owner of any fierce, dangerous, or vicious 
animal to permit such animal to go or be off the 
premises of the owner unless such animal is under 
restraint and properly muzzled as to prevent it 
from injuring any person or property." 
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"E. HEREDITARY CHARACTERISTICS: Certain breeds 
of dogs which by their unique hereditary 
characteristics, owner training or instruction, or 
mistreatment, have a propensity to be vicious. 
These breeds include, but are not limited to the 
Bull Terrier, American Staffordshire Terrier, 
Staffordshire Bull Terrier, Tosa, Shar-pei, and any 
dog determined to be vicious under Subsection B of 
this Section." 
"P. LICENSING REQUIREMENTS: 
The dogs identified under this Section: 
1. Must be licensed under the procedures and 
fees set forth in this ordinance. 
2. Must be kept in a fenced yard, dog run, or 
other structure which is at least 6 feet in height, 
by 6 feet wide, by 10 feet in length. 
3. Must be on a leash and properly muzzled 
when they are out of a fenced area. 
4. Must at the time of licensing, provide 
proof of a fully paid homeowners or rental 
insurance policy containing a personal liability 
clause in the amount of $100,000. 
5. The insurance policy, agent and number 
will be recorded upon licensing, and the agent will 
be notified if the dog is cited for violating this 
chapter. 
6. These requirements must be met before a 
dog license will be issued. 
Section 13-20-31.1: 
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY: Any person required to 
license any animal under the provisions of this 
ordinance, or any person who is or may be subject 
to the enforcement of any provision of this 
ordinance in a civil or criminal proceeding who 
disagrees with the interpretation or application 
of any provision of this ordinance shall make a 
written request to the city manager to determine 
whether and how the provisions of this ordinance 
apply to him or her and to the animals subject to 
the provisions of this ordinance. During the time 
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that the written request is being considered by the 
city manager, no criminal action shall be enforced 
under this ordinance against the person that has 
made the request. The city manager shall rule on 
the request within five days after it is received 
by the city manager. The decision of the city 
manager shall advise the recipient of whether and 
how the provisions of this ordinance applies to the 
request, and if any provision applies, the decision 
shall inform the recipient of how many days the 
person has to comply with the ordinance before the 
ordinance will be enforced against him or her and 
the animal which may be affected by the ordinance. 
If any person affected by the provisions of this 
ordinance takes the position that his or her animal 
is not within the classifications established by 
this ordinance, he or she shall make a written 
request to the city manager under this section. 
The city manager may appoint an expert to advise 
him on matters requiring special knowledge. Where 
an expert is required to advise the city manager, 
the city manager may delay his decision until he 
has received the recommendation of the expert. 
Nothing in this ordinance requires the city to 
dismiss any criminal or civil action brought by the 
city pending his decision. 
4. The matter was heard by the Honorable Rodney S. 
Page, District Court Judge for the Second Judicial District 
Court in a three day non-jury trial on January 12, 13, and 
27, 1989. 
5. On May 8, 1989, Judge Page issued his 
Memorandum Decision, finding that the North Salt Lake 
Ordinance, Section 13-20-01 et seq. was constitutionally 
valid under the due process and equal protection clauses of 
the United States Constitution and the Utah State 
Constitution. The trial court determined, however, that 
part of the definitional provision of "vicious animal" found 
in section 13-20-1(22) of the ordinance, which defined "Any 
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animal by its unique nature or breed which has known 
propensities to be aggressive towards any person or animal" 
as vicious, was constitutionally void. 
6. On July 14, 1989, the trial court entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment. 
7. On August 17, 1989, Greenwoods filed their 
Notice of Appeal seeking review by the Utah Supreme Court of 
the trial court's Findings and Judgment. 
8. The three issues raised by the Greenwoods in 
their appeal of the trial court's findings and judgment, 
involve claims that the trial court erred in determining that 
the North Salt Lake ordinance was constitutionally valid 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 
the Utah State Constitution. More particularly, Greenwoods 
claim (a) that the trial court erred in finding that the 
ordinance did not violate their Fourteenth Amendment rights 
of "equal protection", in that it was not void for vagueness, 
and (b) that the trial court committed error in determining 
that the ordinance was not overinclusive nor underinclusive, 
and that its provisions bore a rational relationship to its 
objective, making its enforcement a "constitutional exercise 
of police power" under the Fourteenth Amendment, and finally, 
(c) that the trial court committed reversible error in 
finding that the evidence at trial established that the breed 
of a dog is typically determined by its predominant physical 
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characteristics [and registration].1 
9. The City of North Salt Lake as respondents, 
contend that all three of the challenges asserted by 
Greenwoods in this appeal, are without merit. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Respondent, the City of North Salt Lake, takes 
issue with some of the representations made in the 
Greenwood's Statement of Relevant Facts, and submit the 
following testimony from the trial court record in support of 
their response to the issues raised therein. 
Concerning the issue of vagueness, trial testimony 
established that the typical method of dog breed 
determination is visual identification based on a dog's 
predominate physical characteristics. (Record, Day 1, pp. 
238-240; Record, Day 1, p. 51. lines 5-25 and p. 52, line 1-
2; Record, Day 1, p. 24, lines 2-11; Record, Day 1, p. 60, 
lines 14-21; Record, Day 1, p. 213-218; Record, Day 1, p. 
232, lines 6-25 and p. 233, lines 1-12; Record, Day 2, p. 
21, lines 14-17; Record, Day 3, p. 61, lines 10-25 and p. 
62, lines 1-14). 
The Greenwoods seem to also discount the expert 
testimony of Dr. Gary Peterson, wherein Dr. Peterson, after 
being qualified as an expert in dog identification and 
1
 Greenwoods agree that the breed of dog may be 
determined by its registration. 
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characteristics of specific breeds, responded as follows; 
Q. "Doctor, in your opinion, based on a visual 
inspection of the predominate physical 
characteristics of the breeds listed in the 
AKC, is it possible to identify the breed of 
any given dog?" 
A. "Certainly of the true breed, yes. They fit 
in certain standards. Of the major 
characteristics if they are dominate major 
characteristics they should fit into a general 
breed standard." 
(Record, Day 3, p. 61, lines 10-17). 
Greenwoods also argue that the language of Section 
13-20-16E which imposes six additional safeguards on dogs 
deemed to be "vicious", and which reads "These breeds 
include, but are not limited to...", fails to give the 
reasonable person notice if his dog is contemplated by the 
ordinance. (Appellant's brief at 6 and 12). Unfortunately, 
appellant has overlooked the fact that Section 13-20-16E 
refers to Section 13-20-16B which defines "Uncontrollable 
Vicious Animal", and by reference makes such animals subject 
to the provisions of Section 13-20-16E. Inasmuch as there 
could be breeds of dogs deemed vicious under 13-20-16B, 
different than those specifically listed in 13-20-16E, the 
language "not limited to" is clear on its face. (See Record, 
Day 3, p. 46, lines 11-25, p. 47, lines 1-22). 
The Greenwoods continue their argument for 
arbitrariness claiming that training is the only factor 
involved in a dog's aggressiveness or propensity for 
viciousness. (Appellant's brief at 6). 
8 
Dr. Peterson testified as follows: 
Qe "Ok. Do you have an opinion as to, ah, to the 
historical background of the breeding of the 
Pit Bull and how that breed might have been 
affected with regard to those characteristics? 
A. "Well from my understanding of the historical 
background these breeds were used primarily 
for Pit fighting, starting in the middle ages. 
Ah, they were bred for those characteristics. 
Q. "Ok. And is it your understanding that not 
only can a dog be bred for physical 
characteristics, but also behavioral 
characteristics? 
A. "Yes I think so." 
(Record, Day 3, p. 64, lines 19-25 and p. 65, lines 
1-5) . 
Lou Lynes, also testified that: 
Q. (Mr. Christiansen): Mr. Lynes could you 
describe briefly for me, the characteristics 
of a Pit Bull in your mind that make it unique 
from all other dogs? 
A. Well when we describe the breed as a Pit Bull, 
the originally bred dog was from a Terrier and 
a Bull Dog, we are looking at a breed that in 
its conception was bred primarily for the 
fighting aspects of the breed itself. Then we 
have gone over into the Staffordshire Terrier 
and other breeds off of that. But basically 
the breed is, ah, originally was bred for a 
fighting dog and has been classified as the 
Pit Bull or the Pit Dog or the dog used in the 
pit for pit fighting. 
(Record, Day 2, p. 138, lines 21-25 and p. 139, 
lines 1-7). 
The most telling flaw in appellant's argument is 
their assertion that "...the only valid determination of 
breed is by having a dog1a registration papers or pedigree 
charts." (Appellant's brief at 6). The record is replete 
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with testimony from both sides that substantiate the fact 
that observation of a dog's predominant physical 
characteristics is the method used in determining its breed. 
(Record, Day 1, pp. 238-240; Record, Day 1, p. 51. lines 5-
25 and p. 52, line 1-2; Record, Day 1, p. 24, lines 2-11; 
Record, Day 1, p. 60, lines 14-21; Record, Day 1, pp. 213-
218; Record, Day 1, p. 232, lines 6-25 and p. 233, lines 1-
12; Record, Day 2, p. 21, lines 14-17; Record, Day 3, p. 
61, lines 10-25 and p. 62, lines 1-14). Even the breed 
established in a dog's registration papers is based upon its 
predominant physical characteristics. (Record, Day 1, p. 
231, lines 8-25 and p. 232, lines 1-5). In addition, the 
City has never taken issue with the fact that the breed of a 
dog cannot be determined from blood or tissue analysis. 
(Record, Day 1, p. 43, lines 19-25). 
Contrary to the Greenwood's assertions (Appellant's 
brief at 7 and 8), numerous witnesses testified that the "pit 
bull" breeds of dogs possess unique hereditary 
characteristics which make them more vicious or dangerous 
than other breeds. (Record, Day 3, p. 7, lines 20-25, p. 8, 
lines 1-25; Record, Day 2, p. 138, lines 21-25 and p. 139, p. 
140, lines 1-7; Record, Day 2, p. 141, lines 12-25; Record, 
Day 2, p. 174, lines 11-14; Record, Day 3, p. 10, lines 7-
25, p. 11, lines 1-16; Record Day 3, p. 46, lines 11-25, p. 
47, lines 1-4; Record, Day 3, p. 51, lines 8-25, p. 52, lines 
1-23; Record, Day 3, p. 62, lines 15-25, p. 63, and p. 64, 
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lines 1-8). 
The Greenwoods also argue in their brief that dog 
bite reports are inconclusive in showing a higher incidence 
of attack and biting for the "pit bull" when compared to 
other breeds. (Appellant's brief at 8). However, testimony 
at trial did indicate that in North Salt Lake during the year 
1987, there was one bite for every four pit bulls registered 
as compared to one bite for every twenty dogs that were 
registered of all other breeds. (Record, Day 2, p. 76, lines 
20-23). In 1988, the ratio in North Salt Lake was one bite 
for every five pit bulls compared to one bite for every 
thirty-five other breeds registered. (Record, Day 3, p. 76, 
lines 1-4). 
In the neighboring city of Salt Lake, where bite 
statistics had been tabulated for a number of years, the "pit 
bull" dogs also had a higher bite incidence than most other 
dogs. (Record, Day 2, p. 169, lines 15-19). Testimony at 
trial also established that the "pit bull" was capable of 
causing severe harm and even death to its victims, (Record, 
Day 2, p. 154, lines 10-25 and p. 155, lines 1-22; Record, 
Day 3, p. 6, lines 11-16), and that animal control officers 
typically handle "pit bulls" more cautiously and different 
than any other dog. (Record, Day 2, p. 141, lines 12-25; 
Record, Day 3, p. 42, lines 14-25 and p. 43, lines 1-5). 
As a result of several attack incidents involving 
the "pit bull" breeds within the limits of the City, North 
11 
Salt Lake enacted the ordinance to protect the health, safety 
and welfare of its citizens. (Record, Day 2, pp. 119-124). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly held that the North Salt 
Lake ordinance met the constitutional requirements for due 
process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 24 
of the Utah State Constitution. The findings and judgment of 
the trial court are substantiated by the evidence adduced at 
trial, and the caselaw upon which the trial court's decision 
is based. 
The trial court correctly found that the breed of a 
dog is determined by registration or by its predominant 
physical characteristics, and, that to be registered, a dog 
must possess the predominant physical characteristics of the 
breed as set forth by the registering association. Further, 
the lower court properly found that the breed of a dog is 
determined by a visual inspection of the dog's predominant 
characteristics, and that the "pit bull" dogs manifest 
certain unique physical characteristics so that they are 
easily discernible from other breeds. Because of their 
unique combination of proportionate strength, agility, 
aggressiveness, courage, intelligence, high tolerance for 
pain, tenacity and gameness, they pose a greater threat than 
other dogs to the health and safety of the citizens of the 
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city so as to warrant additional regulation. 
The trial court properly concluded that the 
Greenwoods failed at trial to overcome the strong presumption 
in favor of the ordinance by a clear and compelling showing. 
Because this case did not involve a fundamental right, nor 
did it involve a suspect class, the trial court correctly 
determined that the object of the enactment involved a 
legitimate state interest and that its classification bore a 
rational relationship to the objective sought. 
Finally, the trial court correctly found that the 
ordinance was not vague in that it is sufficiently clear so 
as to inform the ordinary reader of common intelligence what 
breeds of dogs were subject to the ordinance. The court's 
finding that the predominant characteristics of the "pit 
bull" breed are such that a person of ordinary intelligence 
and common sense would be able to ascertain if his particular 
animal was of the breed specified is extensively supported by 
the evidence. 
Because the Greenwoods have failed to meet their 
burden in showing that the trial court erred in its decision, 
accordingly, the judgment of the trial court must be 
affirmed. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE GREENWOODS HAVE FAILED TO MEET THEIR BURDEN OF 
SHOWING SUBSTANTIAL ERROR ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT 
SO AS TO WARRANT A CHALLENGE TO THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT 
As appellants, the Greenwoods bear the substantial 
burden of establishing that the trial court committed 
reversible error. Their challenge to the findings and 
judgment of the trial court requires that they sustain the 
burden of showing "clearly erroneous" reversible error. Rule 
52(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The appropriate standard of review applicable to a 
challenge of the trial court's findings and judgment is that 
the appellate court should regard the trial court's finding 
and judgment with a presumption of validity and correctness. 
Rule 52(a) Utah R.Civ.P.; Doelle v. Bradley. 124 Ut.Adv.Rep. 
20 (Utah 1989); Hatcheson v. Gleave. 632 P.2d 815 (1981); 
Kohler v. Garden City. 639 P.2d 162 (1981). 
The Greenwoods are required to sustain that burden 
of showing error, based upon a review by the appellate court 
with a presumption of validity to the findings and judgment 
of the trial court, and that the record be construed in the 
light most favorable to the prevailing party at the trial 
court level. The decision of the trial court should not be 
disturbed unless the appellate court finds substantial 
support for such reversal in the evidence. Doelle v. 
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Bradley, supra, 124 Ut.Adv.Rep at 21; Hatcheson v. Gleave, 
supra: Kohler v. Garden City, supra. 
To successfully attack findings of fact, an 
appellant must first marshall all the evidence supporting the 
findings and then demonstrate that, even if viewed in light 
most favorable to the trial court, the evidence is legally 
insufficient to support the findings. Doelle v. Bradley, 124 
Ut.Adv.Rep 20, 21 (1989); Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance 
Company, 776 P. 2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989); In re Estate of 
Bartell. 776 P. 2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989); Scharf v. BMG Corp., 
700 P. 2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). The legal sufficiency of 
the evidence is determined under Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which provides: "Findings of fact, whether 
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to 
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility 
of the witnesses." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(A). A trial court's 
factual finding is deemed " clearly erroneous" only if it is 
against the clear weight of evidence. Reid v. Mutual of 
Omaha Insurance Company, supra, 776 P. 2d at 899-900; In re 
Estate of Bartell. supra, 776 P. 2d at 886; See Western Kane 
County Special Service. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 
744 P. 2d 1376, 1377 (Utah 1987). 
In the present case, the Greenwoods have not 
attempted to marshal the evidence in support of the trial 
court's findings and demonstrate that the evidence supporting 
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the findings is legally insufficient. Their brief presents 
the conflicting evidence in light most favorable to their 
position and largely ignores the contrary evidence. There 
is therefore no reason to disturb the trial courtfs findings. 
The Greenwoods base their appeal on basically three 
areas in which they claim the trial court committed 
reversible error. First they claim that the trial court 
erred when it found that ordinance 13-20-16E was not vague 
and violative of substantive due process. (Appellant's Brief 
at pp. 10-20). Secondly, they claim that the trial court 
committed reversible error when it found that the North Salt 
Lake Ordinance was not discriminatory and did not violate the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 24 of the Utah State 
Constitution. (Appellant's brief pp. 20-24). 
Finally, the Greenwoods claim that the court erred 
in determining that the evidence at trial established that 
the combination of a dog's predominant physical 
characteristics or registration determine its breed. 
(Appellant's brief pp. 24-25). 
On the issue of substantive due process, and more 
particularly, vagueness, the trial court, after hearing three 
full days of testimony from some sixteen witnesses, many of 
which were experts in the field of breed identification, held 
that "the breeds of "pit bull" terriers specified in the 
North Salt Lake City ordinance are breeds of such unique 
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physical characteristics that they are reasonably 
distinguishable from other breeds. The predominant 
characteristics of the breed are such that a person of 
ordinary intelligence and common sense would be able to 
ascertain if his particular animal was of the breed 
specified." (Trial Court Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, hereinafter "Findings", p. 10, para. 24). The evidence 
adduced at trial repeatedly affirmed the unique 
characteristics of the "pit bull" breeds of dogs which makes 
their identification readily ascertainable. (See Statement 
of Relevant Facts, supra). 
The Greenwood's second claim that the trial court 
erred in determining the ordinance was not discriminatory, 
and thus not violative of equal protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the Utah State Constitution is also 
without merit. The trial court, again, after considering all 
of the evidence presented to it and applying the well-settled 
principles of law surrounding the doctrine of equal 
protection, held "that there was a rational basis for the 
North Salt Lake City Council to have determined that the "pit 
bull" breeds do have a unique combination of inherited traits 
which, when coupled with owner training and instruction and 
mistreatment, cause them to have a greater propensity to be 
vicious." (Findings p. 10, para. 23). Relative to 
Greenwood's claim that the ordinance unlawfully discriminated 
against "pit bulls", the trial court found that "the fact 
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that the ordinance was not extended to other breeds similarly 
situated or that it did not extend to all of the evils it 
could have is not a basis for constitutional challenge." 
(Findings p. 11, para. 25). 
Lastly, the court's finding that the breed of a dog 
is determined by either its registration or predominant 
physical characteristics (Findings p. 3, para. 9), and that 
for a dog to be registered it must possess the predominant 
physical characteristics of the particular breed as 
established by the registering association (Finding at p. 3, 
para. 10), is supported throughout the record via testimony 
of witnesses on both sides. Appellant's claim that the 
evidence does not support such a finding borders on the 
ridiculous. 
Based upon the evidence adduced at trial, again by 
witnesses for both of the parties, the court found that "the 
combination of predominant physical characteristics determine 
the dog's breed." (Findings p. 3, para. 12.) "The breed of 
most dogs can be determined by visual inspection of the 
particular dog's predominant physical characteristics." 
(Findings at p. 3, para. 13). Further, that " All of the 
"Pit bull" breeds manifest unique physical characteristics of 
the breed generally so that they are easily discernible from 
other breeds." (Findings at p. 3, para. 14). 
Clearly, the trial court was very careful to 
consider each of the issues which the Greenwoods have raised 
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on appeal. The trial court heard and received extensive 
evidence on the issues of vagueness and substantive due 
process, equal protection, and the related factual question 
of breed identification. The standard of appellate review as 
enumerated in Rule 52(a), and recent decisions of the Utah 
Supreme Court, dictate that appellants bear a significant 
burden to show the trial court committed substantial error in 
making the findings and judgment which it did. The legal 
presumption that the trial court's findings and judgment are 
valid and correct must be overcome by a compelling showing 
that the trial court committed reversible error. 
The Greenwoods have not made such a showing nor 
have they overcome that burden, particularly when one 
considers that the record on review must be construed in the 
light most favorable to the City of North Salt Lake in this 
case. The evidence, on both sides at the trial level, is 
simply too overwhelming to make such a showing. 
II. 
THE GREENWOODS FAILED AT TRIAL TO MEET THEIR BURDEN OF 
OVERCOMING THE PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY 
WHICH ATTACHES TO THE ORDINANCE 
In reviewing an ordinance or statute to ascertain 
its constitutionality, certain rules of construction must be 
applied: 
(a) A legislative enactment is presumed to be 
valid and in conformity with the Constitution. Salt Lake 
City v. Savaae. 541 P.2d 1035, 1037, (Utah 1979); Trade 
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Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., Utah 2d 431, 446 
P.2d 958 (1968); Snow v. Keddinaton. 113 Utah 325, 195 P. 2d 
234 (1948). 
(b) It should not be held to be invalid unless it 
is shown beyond a reasonable doubt to be incompatible with 
some particular Constitutional provision. Id. 
(c) The burden of showing invalidity of an 
ordinance or statute is upon the one who makes the challenge. 
Salt Lake City V. Savage, supra, 541 P.2d at 1037; Trade 
Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., supra. 
In the case of State v. Packard 122 Utah 369, 373, 
250 P.2d 561, 563 (1952), it was stated: 
It is recognized that statutes should not be 
declared unconstitutional if there is any 
reasonable basis upon which they may be sustained 
as falling within the constitutional framework 
[citations omitted], and that a statute will not be 
held void for uncertainty if any sort of sensible, 
practical effect may be given it. [Citations 
omitted.] Id. 
The Supreme Court of the United States in Roth v. U.S. 354 
U.S. 476, 491, (1956), said: 
. . . This Court, however, has consistently held 
that lack of precision is not itself offensive to 
the requirements of due process. ". . . [T]he 
Constitution does not require impossible 
standards"; all that is required is that the 
language "conveys sufficiently definite warning as 
to the proscribed conduct when measured by common 
understanding and practices . . . " United States 
v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8, 67 S.Ct. 1538, 91 
I.Ed. 1877. 
The case of Sunset Amusement Co. v. Board of Police 
Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles, 7 Cal.3d 64, 101 
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Cal.Rptr. 768, 773, 496 P.2d 840, 845 (1972), is also on 
point: 
. . . It should be kept in mind that there are an 
infinite variety of activities or conduct which 
could result in potential or actual danger to the 
"peace, health, safety, convenience, good morals, 
and general welfare" of the public. A municipality 
cannot reasonably be expected to isolate and 
specify those precise activities or conduct which 
are intended to be proscribed. As stated in 
Daniel. quoting from an earlier case, "To make a 
statute sufficiently certain to comply with 
constitutional requirements [of due process of law] 
it is not necessary that it furnishes detailed 
plans and specifications of the acts or conduct 
prohibited." . . . Id. 
There is no question that a city may enact 
ordinances concerning the keeping, use and enjoyment of 
animals, including dogs, within its borders, under its police 
power. 7th Ed. McQuillan, The Law of Municipal Corporations, 
Sec. 24.284 (1981), 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations, Sec. 
212, 218. A city's police power extends even to the 
destruction of dogs in proper cases. As stated in McQuillan, 
Municipal Corporations, supra; 
From time immemorial these animals have been 
considered as holding their lives at the will of 
the legislative power. The primary purpose of 
legislation for the destruction of dogs without 
redress to their owner is the protection of persons 
and property. Such legislation is justifiable 
under the police power to protect life, health and 
property and under power to declare and abate 
nuisances. 
Id. Section 24.289 at 140. 
In this case, the governing body of the City of 
North Salt Lake made a legislative determination that the 
keeping of certain breeds of dogs (generically "pit bulls" 
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and certain other "fighting dogs") within the city limits of 
North Salt Lake, without additional regulation, poses such a 
threat to the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of 
North Salt Lake. The governing body's decision was based 
upon evidence of the inherent aggressiveness of such dogs; 
the unpredictability of these breeds of dogs; their potential 
to harm its citizens; and, the inadequacy of protection 
measures which can be taken by owners of said breeds to 
restrain them from coming into contact with members of the 
general public and other animals. 
The fact that the City of North Salt Lake has 
chosen to regulate only these certain breeds in the manner it 
has, does not make the ordinance invalid. As long as that 
regulation bears a real and substantial relation to the 
public health, safety, morals or general welfare, it must be 
upheld by the court. Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 953 (Utah 
1983); City of Warren v. Testa. 461 N.E.2d 1354 (Ohio Com. 
PI. 1983). 
In a case very similar to ours, the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was 
called upon to review the constitutionality of Chester, 
Pennsylvania's "Pit Bull" ordinance. That city's ordinance 
specified that "Pit Bulls are considered dangerous dogs and 
potentially hazardous to the community." See opinion in 
Starkey v. Township of Chester, 628 FoSupp. 196, 197 (EoD.Pa. 
1986). The ordinance further required that a license be 
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purchased for $500 for each dog less than three, and $3,000 
per dog above three. Owners were required to post a $20,000 
injury bond, confine their dogs to a secure place, be leashed 
and muzzled when not confined, and be destroyed or removed 
from the township if they attacked any person. Id. 
In the Starkey v. Township of Chester, supra, case, 
the plaintiffs claimed that the ordinance was (1) 
discriminatory for applying just to pit bulls, thus violating 
the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights, (2) that it 
violated their First Amendment rights, (3) their due process 
rights, (4) that it violated the interstate commerce clause, 
and finally, (5) that it imposed license fees for pit bulls 
and no other breeds and that the fees were not "reasonably 
related to the costs of the costs of the license fees." Id. 
at 197. 
The court held that despite plaintiff's claims, the 
ordinance met the traditional rational basis test for judging 
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
Starkey. supra, court also found that it was reasonable for 
the township to determine that pit bulls are dangerous. The 
court states, "The township does not have to regulate every 
dangerous animal at the same time in the same manner to pass 
constitutional muster." Id. at 197. The court concluded, the 
"township has not gone too far, insofar as the present record 
shows in regulating, licensing and charging fees for pit 
bulls (Citations omitted). The First Amendment and Commerce 
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Clause claims are frivolous on this record." Id. 197-98. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE NORTH SALT LAKE 
ORDINANCE, SECTION 13-20-16E WAS NOT VAGUE NOR 
VIOLATIVE OF THE GREENWOOD'S SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
RIGHTS, AS MEASURED BY CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS 
The Greenwood's claim that the trial court 
committed reversible error because the language of the North 
Salt Lake ordinance is too vague and ambiguous to meet 
constitutional muster is without merit. Greenwoods argue 
that the trial court was wrong in not making a finding that 
the ordinance was too vague and violated their substantive 
due process rights. Despite overwhelming evidence at trial 
to the contrary, they claim that it is impossible for dog 
owners or law enforcement officers to readily determine the 
breeds of dogs specified in the ordinance. (See Appellant's 
Brief at 11-14). 
Before the court ever gets to that question, 
however, they must first determine if the ordinance will 
significantly compromise any First Amendment protections. As 
stated in 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law, Section 66: 
"Where a statute or regulation is clear as applied 
to him, he cannot challenge the statute on the 
ground that it is vague as applied to others, at 
least in the absence of a regulation of a First 
Amendment freedom. The First Amendment vagueness 
doctrine cannot be invoked by a party who is within 
the hard core prohibitions of an otherwise valid 
statute or regulation whose outer limit may be 
vague as to others." Emphasis added. 
Where no fundamental or First Amendment rights are 
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involved, the appellant cannot raise the issue of vagueness 
as it applies to others. The Greenwoods attack the North 
Salt Lake ordinance on the ground that the ordinance is vague 
as applied to themselves and other persons similarly 
situated. "In order to challenge a statute for vagueness, a 
litigant must show that the statute is vague as applied to 
his conduct,...[W]here a statute or regulation is clear as 
applied to him, he cannot challenge the statute on the 
grounds that it is vague as applied to others,...11 16 C.J.S. 
Constitutional Law, Section 66b, at 179-80 (1985). 
Where no fundamental constitutional or First 
Amendment rights are involved, to succeed, the appellant must 
demonstrate that the law is impermissibly vague in all of its 
applications. Village of Hoffman Estates vs. Flipside, 
Hoffman Estate, 102 S.Ct. 1186 (1982). Therein it was 
stated: 
"In a facial challenge to the overbreadth and 
vagueness of a law, a court's first task is to 
determine whether the enactment reaches a 
substantial amount of Constitutionally protected 
conduct. If it does not, then the overbreadth 
challenge must fail. The Court should then examine 
the facial vagueness challenge, and assuming the 
enactment implicates no constitutionally protected 
conduct, should uphold the challenge only if the 
enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its 
applications." (p.1191) (Emphasis supplied). 
See also. State v. Hoffman. 733 P.2d 502 (Utah 1987). 
The Greenwoods apparently make no claim that their 
First Amendment rights have been affected by the North Salt 
Lake ordinance, hence their assertion that the ordinance is 
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overbroad must fail. The standard of review then focuses on 
whether the language of the ordinance is impermissibly vague 
in all of its applications. Id. 
1. ADEQUATE NOTICE 
The Greenwoods cite the U.S. Supreme Court case of 
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)# as support 
for their claim that the North Salt Lake ordinance is vague 
and violative of their substantive due process rights. 
(Appellant's brief at 11). 
The Grayned, supra, case involved a challenge to 
the Rockford City ordinance which made it unlawful to 
willfully make a noise that disturbs or tends to disturb the 
peace and good order of a school session. Grayned, who was a 
participant in a public demonstration outside a Rockford High 
School was charged with violating the Rockford noise 
ordinance. He argued that his First Amendment rights had 
been violated, and that the ordinance was vague and deprived 
him of his substantive due process rights. The Court, even 
after applying the strict scrutiny for First Amendment 
claims, held that the ordinance was not invalid. 408 U.S. at 
121. 
In the case at bar, Greenwoods argue that the North 
Salt Lake ordinance fails to provide the average person of 
ordinary intelligence fair and adequate notice of what breeds 
are covered by the ordinance. (Appellant's brief at p. 12). 
However, the ordinance specifically enumerates at Section 13-
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20-16E the Bull Terrier, the American Staffordshire Terrier, 
Staffordshire Terrier, Staffordshire Bull Terrier, American 
Pit Bull Terrier, Tosa, Shar-pei, and any other dog 
determined to be vicious under subsection B. (North Salt Lake 
Ordinances, Section 13-20-16E). The trial court below made a 
specific finding that the Bull Terrier, the American 
Staffordshire Terrier, Staffordshire Terrier, Staffordshire 
Bull Terrier, American Pit Bull Terrier, (generically 
referred to as "pit bulls") "manifest unique physical 
characteristics of the breed generally so that they are 
easily discernible from other breeds." (Findings at p. 3, 
para. 14}. Obviously, if a dog is not registered as one of 
the above breeds, and if it does not manifest the predominate 
physical characteristics of the named breeds, it would not be 
subject to the ordinance. 
Greenwoods also argue that the language of Section 
13-20-16E which imposes six additional safeguards on dogs 
deemed to be "vicious", and which reads "These breeds 
include, but are not limited to...", fails to give the 
reasonable person notice if his dog is contemplated by the 
ordinance. (Appellant's brief at 12). Unfortunately, they 
have overlooked the fact that Section 13-20-16E refers to 
Section 13-20-16B which defines "Uncontrollable Vicious 
Animal", and by reference makes such animals subject to the 
provisions of Section 13-20-16E. Inasmuch as there could be 
breeds of dogs deemed vicious under 13-20-16B, different than 
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those specifically listed in 13-20-16B, the language "not 
limited to" is clear on its face. 
2. ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY 
In their brief, the Greenwoods totally ignore the 
fact that the North Salt Lake ordinance also makes provision 
for an administrative remedy for any person aggrieved by its 
application. Section 13-20-31.1 states as follows: 
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY: Any person required to 
license any animal under the provisions of this 
ordinance, or any person who is or may be subject 
to the enforcement of any provision of this 
ordinance in a civil or criminal proceeding who 
disagrees with the interpretation or application 
of any provision of this ordinance shall make a 
written request to the city manager to determine 
whether and how the provisions of this ordinance 
apply to him or her and to the animals subject to 
the provisions of this ordinance. During the time 
that the written request is being considered by the 
city manager, no criminal action shall be enforced 
under this ordinance against the person that has 
made the request. The city manager shall rule on 
the request within five days after it is received 
by the city manager. The decision of the city 
manager shall advise the recipient of whether and 
how the provisions of this ordinance applies to the 
request, and if any provision applies, the decision 
shall inform the recipient of how many days the 
person has to comply with the ordinance before the 
ordinance will be enforced against him or heir and 
the animal which may be affected by the ordinance. 
If any person affected by the provisions of this 
ordinance takes position that his or her animal is 
not within the classifications established by this 
ordinance, he or she shall make a written request 
to the city manager under this section. The city 
manager may appoint an expert to advise him on 
matters requiring special knowledge. Where an 
expert is required to advise the city manager, the 
city manager may delay his decision until he has 
received the recommendation of the expert. Nothing 
in this ordinance requires the city to dismiss any 
criminal or civil action brought by the city 
pending his decision. 
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The effect of this provision is to allow any person 
who may be concerned about the application of the ordinance 
to him or her, an additional forum for review and protection. 
3. ENFORCEMENT 
The Greenwoods further claim that law enforcement 
officers and those administering the ordinance are unable to 
determine the extent and application of the ordinance. 
(Appellant's brief at 14). They go so far as to state in 
their brief that: 
"The registration papers, evincing a dog's 
genealogy, are the only reasonably accurate means 
of determining a particular dog's breed membership. 
No other methods, observations, or perceptions 
exist whereby breed can, accurately and without 
great subjectivity, be determined." (Appellant's 
brief at 15). 
At the trial of this matter, witnesses on both 
sides of the case testified over and over again that a dog's 
breed membership was determined by the visual observation of 
its predominate physical characteristics. (Record, Day 1, pp. 
238-240; Record, Day 1, p.51. lines 5-25 and p.52, line 1-2; 
Record, Day 1, p. 24, lines 2-11; Record, Day 1, p. 60, lines 
14-21; Record, Day 1, p. 213-218; Record, Day 1, p. 232, 
lines 6-25 and p. 233, lines 1-12; Record, Day 3, p. 61, 
lines 10-25 and p. 62, lines 1-14). 
North Salt Lake Animal Control Officer Jeff Tingey, 
at the first day of the trial, testified that given the 
opportunity to visually observe any dog, he could determine 
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the predominate breed of that dog. (Record, Day 1, p.22, 
lines 8-11, 21-25; Record, Day 1, p.23, lines 19-25, and 
p.24, line 1). Animal control officers further testified 
that visual observation of the predominate physical 
characteristics of a dog was typically how breeds of dogs are 
identified in animal control, and that enforcement of the 
North Salt Lake ordinance would not pose a problem to them. 
(Record, Day 1, p. 24, lines 2-11; Record, Day 3, p. 11, 
lines 11-16). 
The appellate court, in determining 
constitutionally where vagueness is alleged, is obligated to 
construe the ordinance in a manner that will avoid an 
unconstitutional infirmity, if possible. People vs. Ortez, 
479 N.Y.2d 613 (1986). 
In the Ortez, supra, case the court stated that: 
"The Constitution only requires reasonable 
precision from the legislative drafting; it does 
not impose impossible standards. Ordinary 
terminology may be used to express idea that find 
adequate interpretation in common usage and 
understanding. If the general class of offenses to 
which the statute is directed is plain within its 
terms, the statute will not be struck down as vague 
even though marginal cases may be put where doubt 
might arise." 
Id- at 613. 
The evidence adduced at trial clearly supports the 
trial court's finding that the language of the ordinance was 
such that the person of ordinary and common intelligence 
would know whether or not his breed of dog was subject 
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thereto. The evidence also supported the court's finding 
that the breed of a dog is determined by registration or its 
predominate physical characteristics, and that the "pit bull" 
breeds of dogs possessed certain unique characteristics which 
make them discernible from other breeds. 
Based upon the evidence, the court determined that 
the North Salt Lake ordinance, Section 13-20-16E was not 
vague, and that appellant's substantive due process rights 
had not be violated. That finding and judgment is supported 
by the evidence and the applicable caselaw and should be 
upheld. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT 
THE NORTH SALT LAKE ORDINANCE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION, IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 24 OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION, AND THAT 
ITS ENACTMENT WAS A VALID EXERCISE OF THE CITYfS POLICE POWER 
The Greenwoods have raised on appeal, the question 
as to whether the North Salt Lake ordinance is a valid 
exercise of police power under the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 24 of the Utah 
State Constitution. (Appellant's brief at 21). Police power 
includes all laws, restraining or prohibiting, anything 
harmful to the welfare of the public. State v. Hoffman, 
supra; Kalodimos vs. Morton Grove. 470 N.E.2d 266 (111. 
1984). 
The enactment of North Salt Lake's ordinance by its 
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governing body was an exercise of the City's police power. 
It is well settled that an exercise of police power which has 
the effect of depriving a person of property will be valid if 
it bears a real and substantial relation to the public 
health, safety, morals or general welfare of the public* 
Peck v. Dunn. 574 P.2d 367 (Utah 1978); City of Lyons v. 
Suttle, 209 Kan. 735, 498 P.2d 9 (1972). 
It is also well established in Utah that the 
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance is presumed, and 
that the burden is upon one attacking its validity to clearly 
show that it violates the Constitution. Provo City Corp. v. 
Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 458 (1989); Salt Lake City Corporation 
v. Savage. 541 P.2d 1035, cert. denied. 96 S.Ct. 1514, 425 
U.S. 915 (Utah 1975). Thus, an ordinance passed pursuant to 
a city's police power will be held invalid only if it bears 
no real and substantial relation to the public health, 
safety, morals or general welfare of the public. In Grigsby 
v. Mitchum. 380 P.2d 363 (1963), it was held: 
Whether an exercise of the police power does bear a 
real and substantial relation to the public health, 
basic morals or general welfare of the public, and 
whether it is unreasonable or arbitrary are 
questions which are committed in the first instance 
to the judgment and discretion of the legislative 
body, and unless the decisions of such legislative 
body on those questions appear to be clearly 
erroneous, the court will not invalidate them. 
Id. at 365. 
In the present appeal, the appellants claim that 
the ordinance in question is arbitrary and capricious because 
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it selects for regulation certain breeds of animal. There 
is no merit to such a contention, however. In City of Warren 
v. Testa, 461 N.E.2d 1354 (Ohio Com. PI. 1983) the court 
addressed a similar issue with respect to an ordinance which 
prohibited the keeping and harboring of lions within the City 
of Warren. The Court stated: 
It is a fact that other animals or various species 
have the ability to bite and do harm . . . a fact 
confirmed by witnesses on both sides of the case. 
The Defendant's claim of selectivity of the 
ordinance fails in view of the long established 
principle of law that a legislative authority has 
the right to legislate out nuisances as they are 
called to said legislative authority's attention. 
Perhaps the lion could argue the principle of 
selectivity; however, certainly the City Council 
has the right to legislate here, supplement later, 
and address each so called "nuisance" as it arises. 
Id. 461 N.E.2d at 1357. 
The governing body of the City of North Salt Lake 
determined that the breeds of dogs commonly known as the "pit 
bull", the shar-pei, and the tosa, pose such an immediate and 
serious threat to the public health, safety and welfare, that 
an ordinance regulating their possession was necessary to 
protect the citizens of North Salt Lake. Though it may be 
true that other breeds of dogs, as well as other species of 
animals, not currently prohibited from being kept or 
otherwise regulated within the City of North Salt Lake's 
limits are also dangerous, the governing body of North Salt 
Lake obviously felt that the breeds of dogs named in the 
ordinance pose a greater and more immediate threat of harm to 
the public health, safety and welfare that such other 
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animals. There is certainly no Constitutional requirement 
that a city must regulate all breeds or none at all. Starkey 
v. Township of Chester, supra. 628 F.2d at 197. 
The minimal showing of relation to the public 
welfare necessary to uphold the constitutionally of a 
legislative enactment is illustrated by the decision in 
Quilici vs. Village of Morton Grove, 695 Fed.2d 261 (1982), 
where the Court upheld an ordinance totally banning handguns 
within the borders of the Village, stating that: 
"...there is at least some empirical evidence that 
gun control legislation may reduce the number of 
deaths and accidents caused by handguns. This 
evidence is sufficient to sustain the conclusion 
that Ordinance No. 81-11 is not wholly arbitrary 
not completely unsupported by any set of facts. 
Accordingly, we decline to consider Plaintiff's 
argument that Ordinance No. 81-11 will not make 
Morton Grove a safer more peaceful place." 
This celebrated decision is a significant and 
persuasive illustration of the broad scope of the police 
power of a municipality as it pertains to instrumentalities 
with potential to do harm. Further, the Starkey, supra, case 
held "The township does not have to regulate every dangerous 
animal at the same time in the same manner to pass 
constitutional muster." 628 F.Supp. at 197 (E.D.Pa. 1986) 
The court in Starkey. supra. said that "The 
township could reasonably determine, as it did, that pit 
bulls are dangerous. The Township's Health Officer testified 
that the regulation was necessary in this densely populated 
Township the pit bull bites to kill without signal." Id* 628 
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F.Supp. at 197. 
As a municipal corporation, the City of North Salt 
Lake is interested in, and charged with, the protection of 
the health, safety and welfare of its citizens. Its 
governing body has determined that the breeds of dogs 
specified in the ordinance are dangerous and pose a threat to 
the public's health, safety and welfare. The governing body, 
therefore, properly passed the subject ordinance to protect 
its citizen's health, safety and welfare. 
Substantial evidence adduced at trial established 
that the breeds specified in the ordinance (commonly referred 
to as "pit bulls"), are dangerous and pose a greater 
potential to do harm to other animals and people, than other 
breeds of dogs. The City therefore was justified in its 
determination that without additional regulation, those 
particular breeds posed a significant threat to the citizens 
of North Salt Lake. The Greenwood's argument that the North 
Salt Lake ordinance violates rights protected under the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 1, 
Section 24 of the Utah Constitution is groundless. 
V. 
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDING THAT THE BREED OF A DOG IS DETERMINED 
BY REGISTRATION OR BY PREDOMINANT PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS 
In Section III of their brief, the Greenwoods argue 
that the trial court made an erroneous finding that the breed 
of a dog was determined by its predominant physical 
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characteristics. (Appellant's brief at 24). 
The trial court did in fact make a finding that 
"The breed of a dog is determined by registration or by 
predominant physical characteristics." (Findings at p. 3, 
para. 9). The Greenwoods do not challenge the fact that 
breed may be indicated by registration papers, but they do 
claim the evidence did not support a finding that the 
predominant physical characteristics of a dog determine its 
breed classification. 
The Greenwood brief recognizes that evidence at 
trial concerning breed identification came from both sides 
(Appellant's brief at 24). In fact, evidence at trial 
confirming that the predominant physical characteristics do 
determine the breed classification of a dog was overwhelming 
from witnesses and evidence offered by both of the parties. 
(Record, Day 1, pp. 238-240; Record, Day 1, p. 51. lines 5-
25 and p. 52, line 1-2; Record, Day 1, p. 24, lines 2-11; 
Record, Day 1, p. 60, lines 14-21; Record, Day 1, pp. 213-
218; Record, Day 1, p. 232, lines 6-25 and p. 233, lines 1-
12; Record, Day 2, p. 21, lines 14-17; Record, Day 3, p. 
61, lines 10-25 and p. 62, lines 1-14). 
The Greenwood's suggestion that "the trial court 
should have found breed identification only by use of 
registration and pedigree charts as such are the only 
objective method of accurate breed identification", is 
circuitous. (Appellant's brief at 25). Registration itself 
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is based on a visual observation of a dog's predominant 
physical characteristics. (See Statement of Relevant Facts, 
supra at 9) . Pedigree charts themselves rely solely on the 
dog owner's observation of the dog's predominant 
characteristics and his determination of the breed of the 
parents of the dog. The record below clearly supports the 
trial court's determination that breed is determined by a 
dog's predominant physical characteristics. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the trial court's findings and judgment, 
the overwhelming weight of evidence in the record and legal 
precedent which supports the finding and judgment, coupled 
with the foregoing arguments, the City of North Salt Lake 
respectfully submits that the decision of the trial court 
must be upheld. 
KENT.L. CHRISTIANSEN, P.C. 
N0rth Salt Lake City Attorney 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
Section 13-20-01: 
"22. VICIOUS ANIMAL: Any animal which is 
dangerously aggressive or uncontrollable, including 
but not limited to, any animal which has bitten or 
in any manner attacked any person or animal. Any 
animal by its unique nature or breeding which has 
known propensities to be aggressive towards any 
person or animal." 
Section 13-20-16: 
"A. PREMISES, MUZZLE: It shall be unlawful for 
the owner of any fierce, dangerous, or vicious 
animal to permit such animal to go or be off the 
premises of the owner unless such animal is under 
restraint and properly muzzled as to prevent it 
from injuring any person or property." 
"E. HEREDITARY CHARACTERISTICS: Certain breeds 
of dogs which by their unique hereditary 
characteristics, owner training or instruction, or 
mistreatment, have a propensity to be vicious. 
These breeds include, but are not limited to the 
Bull Terrier, American Staffordshire Terrier, 
Staffordshire Bull Terrier, Tosa, Shar-pei, and any 
dog determined to be vicious under Subsection B of 
this Section." 
"F. LICENSING REQUIREMENTS: 
The dogs identified under this Section: 
1. Must be licensed under the procedures and 
fees set forth in this ordinance. 
2. Must be kept in a fenced yard, dog run, or 
other structure which is at least 6 feet in height, 
by 6 feet wide, by 10 feet in length. 
3. Must be on a leash and properly muzzled 
when they are out of a fenced area. 
4. Must at the time of licensing, provide 
proof of a fully paid homeowners or rental 
insurance policy containing a personal liability 
clause in the amount of $100,000. 
5. The insurance policy, agent and number 
will be recorded upon licensing, and the agent will 
be notified if the dog is cited for violating this 
chapter. 
6. These requirements must be met before a 
dog license will be issued. 
Section 13-20-31.1: 
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY: Any person required to 
license any animal under the provisions of this 
ordinance, or any person who is or may be subject 
to the enforcement of any provision of this 
ordinance in a civil or criminal proceeding who 
disagrees with the interpretation or application 
of any provision of this ordinance shall make a 
written request to the city manager to determine 
whether and how the provisions of this ordinance 
apply to him or her and to the animals subject to 
the provisions of this ordinance. During the time 
that the written request is being considered by the 
city manager, no criminal action shall be enforced 
under this ordinance against the person that has 
made the request. The city manager shall rule on 
the request within five days after it is received 
by the city manager. The decision of the city 
manager shall advise the recipient of whether and 
how the provisions of this ordinance applies to the 
request, and if any provision applies, the decision 
shall inform the recipient of how many days the 
person has to comply with the ordinance before the 
ordinance will be enforced against him or her and 
the animal which may be affected by the ordinance. 
If any person affected by the provisions of this 
ordinance takes the position that his or her animal 
is not within the classifications established by 
this ordinance, he or she shall make a written 
request to the city manager under this section. 
The city manager may appoint an expert to advise 
him on matters requiring special knowledge. Where 
an expert is required to advise the city manager, 
the city manager may delay his decision until he 
has received the recommendation of the expert. 
Nothing in this ordinance requires the city to 
dismiss any criminal or civil action brought by the 
city pending his decision. 
EXHIBIT "BI! 
KENT L. CHRISTIANSEN, P.C. 
MUELLER £r CHRISTIANSEN 
300 IBM Plaza Building 
420 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-3762 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
KATE GREENWOOD, et al.# ) 
Plaintiffs, ) FINDINGS OP FACT 
) AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. ) 
CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, an ) Civil No. 40876 
incorporated Municipality, ) Judge Rodney S. Page 
Defendants. ) 
This matter came on regularly before the court for 
a non-jury trial, on January 12, 13, and 27, 1989, the 
Honorable Rodney S. Page, Utah State District Judge, 
presiding: David Paul White appearing for the plaintiffs, 
Kate Greenwood, Andrew Greenwood, and the American Dog 
Breeders Association (hereinafter "Greenwood"); Kent L. 
Christiansen of Mueller & Christiansen, appearing for the 
defendant Citv of North Salt Lake (hereinafter HNorth Salt 
Lake"); and the parties having adduced evidence by way of 
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testimony and documentary exhibits and having argued the 
matter to the court, and the court having reviewed the file 
exhibits and memoranda submitted by the parties and being 
fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing, now, 
therefore, the court hereby makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Certain of the plaintiffs reside within the 
City of North Salt Lake. 
2. Said residents own dogs of the breed known as 
the American Pit Bull Terrier. 
3. That plaintiffs own a kennel in North Salt 
Lake which raises, breeds, boards and sells dogs of the 
American Pit Bull Terrier breed. 
4. The plaintiff, Kate Greenwood, is president of 
the American Dog Breeders Association, which has its 
principal office in North Salt Lake and which recognized and 
registers the American Pit Bull Terrier breed. 
5. "Pit bull" is a generic term generally 
referring to breeds made up of the Bull Terrier, American 
Staffordshire Terrier, Staffordshire. Bull Terrier and the 
American Pit Bull Terrier and when the Court uses the term 
"pit bull" it uses it in its generic sense. 
6. The American Staffordshire Terrier and the 
American Pit Bull Terrier are generally recognized as the 
same breed. 
7. The most generally accepted association for 
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registering and classifying dogs in the United States is the 
American Kennel Club or AKC as it is commonly known. 
8. The AKC recognizes three breeds of "pit 
bulls11: The American Staffordshire Terrier, the Bull 
Terrier, and the Staffordshire Bull Terrier. 
9. The breed of a dog is determined by 
registration or by predominant, pnysiuax LuaiauLcustics, 
10. To be registered a doa must possess the 
predominant physical characteristics of the particular breed 
as set by the registering association. 
11. There is no scientific method for determining 
a dog's breed such as blood test# x-rays or scientific tests. 
12. The combination of predominant physical 
characteristics determine the dog's breed. 
13. The breed of most dogs can be determined by 
visual inspection of the particular dog's predominant 
physical characteristics. 
14. All of the ••pit bull" breeds manifest unique 
physical characteristics of the breed generally so that they 
are easily discernible from other breeds. 
15. The "pit bull" breeds are known for their 
unique combination of proportionate strength, agility, 
aggressiveness, courage, intelligence, high tolerance for 
pain, tenacity and gameness. 
16. The "pit bull" breeds were historically bred 
exclusively for fighting and killing other animals; namely, 
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other dogs. 
17. Worth Salt Lake City is primarily a 
residential community. 
18. North Salt Lake City has experienced over the 
years a number of bites and attacks by "pit bulls16. These 
bites and attacks are substantially nigner among "pit bull" 
breeds than any other breed given the proportionate number of 
"pit bulls11 in the Cityfs dog population* 
19. "Pit bulls" have killed other dogs, attacked 
people and on one occasion attempted on numerous occasions to 
attack humans through a glass door. 
20. In Salt Lake City, a neighboring community, in 
1988 there were 295 dog bites; 28 were from "pit bull". The 
only breed with more bites in total number was the German 
Shepherd of which there were five or six times as many as 
"pit bulls" in the dog population. 
21. Bites by "pit bulls" in Salt Lake City were 
proportionately higher than any other breed. 
22. Animal Control treats "pit bulls" differently 
than any other breed: They are kept separate from other dogs 
and behind solid walls where possible; a breaking stick is 
often required to loosen their jaws from the grip of a 
victim; they are treated with more caution than any other 
breed. 
23. Because ofc the reputation of the "pit bull" 
breeds they are acquired by certain people in order to 
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capitalize on their reputation and natural characteristics 
and make them mean and aggressive. 
24. In 1986, the North Salt Lake City council 
adopted the ordinance herein question. It was amended in 
1987 to add the breed of the American Pit Bull Terrier to the 
breed specific portion or rne ordinance ana to provide for 
administrative review for those aggrieved by the ordinance. 
25. The City considered the facts set forth above 
concerning the "pit bull" breeds prior to adopting the 
ordinance• 
26. Among other things, the ordinance categorized 
certain animals as "fierce, dangerous, or vicious animals" in 
terms of certain breeds which by their unique hereditary 
characteristics, owner training and instruction or 
mistreatment had propensity to be vicious. The "pit bull" 
breeds (along with other breeds not at issue here) were 
named. These breeds were made subject to special licensing, 
confinement restrictions and insurance provisions. 
27. The ordinance also defined "vicious animals", 
among other things, as "any animal by its unique nature or 
breeding that has known propensities to be aggressive towards 
any person or animal". 
28. The plaintiffs who own dogs of the "pit bull" 
breed, named and carry on a business concerned with the 
breed, filed this action challenging the constitutionality of 
the provisions in question, 
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29. The plaintiffs1 challenge to the ordinance in 
question center around their claim that it violates the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Nequal 
protection19 clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, 
Section XXIV of the Utah Constitution. They further claim 
that the ordinance constitutes an umawtui taxina. 
From the foregoing Findinas of Fact, the Court 
draws the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the evidence adduced at trial requires 
the Court to conclude that plaintiffs have standing to 
challenge the validity of the terms of the ordinance in 
question, in light of the fact that the provisions challenged 
are applicable to them and will be enforced against them. 
2. In reviewing any ordinance or statute to 
ascertain its constitutionality, this Court is bound by 
certain well-settled general rules of construction. 
3. Legislative enactments are endowed with a 
strong presumption of validity, and they should not be 
declared unconstitutional if there is any reasonable basis 
upon which they can be found to come within the 
constitutional framework. 
4. They should not be held unconstitutional 
unless there is a clear and compelling showing that they are 
incompatible with some particular constitutional provision. 
5. The burden of showing invalidity of a 
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legislative enactment is on the one who makes the challenge• 
6. The concept of due process, as guaranteed by 
the U.S. Constitution and our own State Constitution is 
somewhat difficult to define. However, generally it is 
broken down into the concept of substantive due process and 
procedural due process. 
7. Substantive due process generally embodies the 
concept of equal protection and freedom from arbitrary 
action. The essence of substantive due process is 
characterized as Na standard of reasbnableness" which is 
similar to the test of ••rational grounds11 used to evaluate 
equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
8* Procedural due process revolves around the 
idea of notice, jurisdiction, right of hearing and fairness. 
9. It is also fair to say that the two concepts 
are not completely separate and that certain aspects of each 
intertwine with the other. 
10. In reviewing any legislative act, in light of 
the challenge for violation of due process and equal 
protection, the initial inquiry must be as to whether or not 
the enactment in question seeks to interfere with a 
fundamental right or operates to the particular disadvantage 
of a suspect class. If it does, then the latitude given the 
governmental agency is much reduced and the inquiry of the 
court is one of strict scrutiny* There must be a compelling 
state interest to allow the intrusion or the classification 
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and the means chosen for such intrusion must be the least 
intrusive possible. 
11. On the other hand, if we are not dealing with 
a fundamental right nor a suspect class, the legislative body 
is given much more flexibility and latitude in regulating and 
classifying and the Court's only inauirv is to determine if 
the object of the enactment concerns a legitimate State 
interest and whether any classification Gears a reasonable 
relationship to that objective and whether there is a 
reasonable basis for the distinction between the classes. 
12. The Court does not substitute its opinion for 
that of the legislative body. The Court presumes that the 
local authorities are familiar with local conditions and know 
the needs of the community nor is the Court concerned that 
the same objective may be arrived at by a less intrusive 
manner• 
13. Classifications are not unreasonable or 
arbitrary as long as similar situated people are dealt with 
in a similar manner and people situated differentlv are not 
treated as if their circumstances were the same. 
14. Classifications need not be applied with 
mathematical exactness. 
15. It is also clear that if a classification is 
not arbitrary and is founded on any substantial distinction 
or apparent naturax reason which suggests a necessity or 
propriety of the special legislation, a Court has no right to 
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interfere with the exercise of legislative discretion. 
16. The concept of vagueness is one which involves 
both principles of due process and equal protection. These 
concepts require an enactment to be sufficiently explicit and 
clear so as to inform the ordinary reader of common 
intelligence what conduct is Drohibited, There is no 
vagueness when the enactment contains terms which the 
ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense can 
understand and comply with. 
17 • It is not the Court *s duty to indulge in 
conjecture that the ordinance may be so distorted or 
unreasonably applied that some innocent person might come 
within its terms. The Court is required to assume that those 
who administer an ordinance will do so within reason and 
common sense, and in accordance with its language and intent. 
18. If there is a choice as to the manner of its 
interpretation and application, that should be done in a 
manner which will make it constitutional as opposed to one 
which would make it invalid. 
19. The Court further recognizes that this case 
does not involve any fundamental rights or suspect 
classifications• 
20. One of the major points of contention between 
the parties is one of whether the breed specific provision of 
the ordinance bears a reasonable, rational relationship to 
the objectives sought to be accomplished and whether there is 
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a reasonable basis to specify the "pit bull" breeds for 
special classification. 
21. The object of the legislation is obvious in 
attempting to specify those breeds of dogs which constitute 
an unreasonably high risk of danger to the public and then in 
requiring certain precautions so as to reduce that risk. 
22. That none of the parties dispute that the 
controlling of vicious animals and the protection of citizens 
therefrom is a legitimate State interest, nor that North Salt 
Lake City has authority to address the same by ordinance. 
23. That based upon the evidence adduced at trial 
the Court concludes that there is a rational basis for the 
North Salt Lake City council to have determined that the Npit 
bull" breeds do have a unique combination of inherited traits 
which, when coupled with owner training and instruction or 
mistreatment, cause them to have a greater propensity to be 
vicious. 
24. Further, that based upon the evidence adduced 
at trial, the Court concludes that the breeds of "pit bull" 
terriers specified in the North Salt Lake City ordinance are 
breeds of such unique physical characteristics that they are 
reasonably distinguishable from othei breeds. The 
predominant characteristics of the breed are such that a 
person of ordinary intelligence and common sense would be 
able to ascertain if his particular animal was of the breed 
specified. 
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25. The Court finds that the fact that the 
ordinance was not extended to other breeds similarly situated 
or that it did not extend to all of the evils it could have 
is not a basis for constitutional challenge. 
26. That based upon the evidence adduced at trial 
the Court concludes the designation or -pit Dull" as a class 
and the requirement of special licensing and the compliance 
with special conditions and handling has a reasonable and 
rational relationship with one of the objectives of the 
ordinance, which is to protect the citizens and other animals 
from attack by dogs. 
27. That the plaintiffs1 challenge to the breed 
specific provision of the ordinance on the basis of equal 
protection and due process fail even when exposed to the 
slightly more intensive scrutiny required by the Utah Supreme 
Court under our Constitution in the commercial setting. 
28. That relative to the provision of the 
ordinance, which among other things defines a vicious animal 
as Hany animal by its unique nature or breeding which has 
known propensities to be aggressive towards any person or 
animal"f the Court concludes that the said provision is 
vague and overbroad in that it v»ould leave the ordinary 
reader of common intelligence at a loss to determine whether 
his particular animal came within the purview of the 
ordinance and thus could only guess as to its applicability 
to him. Accordingly, said provision fails to meet due 
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process requirements as to definiteness and therefore the 
Court concludes that that portion of the definition of 
vicious animals which define the same in terms of a 
"propensity for aggressiveness as a result of unique nature 
or breeding11 to be void for vaaueness. 
29. Based upon the evidence adduced at trial, the 
Court further concludes that plaintiffs1 argument as to the 
unlawful taking is without basis in law or fact and 
rejects the same. 
DATED this , day of May, 1989. 
BY THE COURTS 
Approved as to Forms 
Datfid Paul White 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
RODNEY S. PAGE 
District Court Judge 
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